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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
14720 
MICHAEL DON PETERSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE.CASE 
The appellant, Michael Don Peterson, appeals from 
a judgment entered against him in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court of Utah, the Honorable George E. Ballif, 
presiding, following a conviction for Forcible Sexual Abuse. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried before the Honorable George E. 
Ballif, sitting with a jury. The jury returned a verdict 
finding the appellant guilty of Forcible Sexual Abuse, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (1953), as amended. 
The judgment, sentence and commitment were entered. From 
the action of the trial court the appellant appeals. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict and 
judgment of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 24, 1976, at approximately 9:00 
p.m., Mrs. Sandy Murphy, an Orem resident, was attacked 
sexually as she walked home from a church meeting. A 
man, later identified as appellant, approached her from 
behind, put his hand over her mouth, pushed her to the 
ground and put his hand under her dress, coming in 
contact with her genitals, through her underwear (T.9). 
Mrs. Murphy screamed and struggled and the assailant 
ran off (T.11). 
On the evening of April 7, 1976, appellant 
was approached by a police officer while he was out 
walking (T.21). The police officer asked for his 
identification, found that he matched the description 
and name of a person being sought for questioning, 
and asked appellant to accompany him to the police 
station for questioning (T.22). 
In the course of the evening, appellant 
gave a statement admitting that he was the man who had 
attacked Mrs. Murphy, and that he had done it out of 
sexual desire (T.32,33). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUSTAINING THE 
OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S LINE OF QUESTIONING REGARDING 
REASONS FOR APPELLANT'S PRESENCE AT THE POLICE STATION. 
Police stopped appellant on April 7, 1976, when 
he was walking in the same vicinity where Mrs. Murphy 
had been attacked approximately two weeks earlier (T.21). 
Officer Taylor asked for appellant's identification and 
found that he matched the name of the person being sought 
for this offense. Officer Taylor then asked if appellant 
would accompany him to the police station to answer some 
questions. Appellant said he would go if it would not 
take too long, voluntarily got in the car and went to 
the station with the officers (T.22). As appellant's 
brief correctly states, no arrest was made at this 
time. 
During cross-examination of Officer Taylor, 
the appellant's counsel tried to discover information 
concerning another crime for which appellant was also a 
suspect at the time. The prosecution objected and 
the objection was sustained. 
-3-
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Respondent submits that at no time was defendant 
illegally arrested or detained. He went freely with the 
police when he was first stopped and voluntarily stayed 
at the station during questioning. Nothing in the 
transcript indicates that appellant thought he was 
under arrest or was being forcibly detained. 
Since appellant was not arrested or forcibly 
detained before or during questioning, the complaint 
that appellant was falsely arrested is invalid and 
questions asked in hope of supporting that theory were 
immaterial. Therefore, an objection to a question 
relating to the other crime for which appellant was 
also a suspect was properly sustained. 
This question of whether defendant was arrested 
or went by consent to the station was twice answered by 
the trial court, once at suppression hearing prior to 
the trial and once at the trial itself (T.25). The 
trial court had ample opportunity to review the facts 
and consider appellant's position in this regard. Such 
a well founded decision of the trial court should not 
be disturbed. 
-4-
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING 
APPELLANT'S ORAL TESTIMONY TO BE ADMITTED AS 
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL. 
As outlined in Point I above, respondent 
submits that appellant was not illegally detained 
at the time he made his admission as to his attack 
on Mrs. Murphy. Appellant's rights were carefully 
explained to him at least three times while he was 
at the police station (T.27,31). He waived his right 
to have an attorney and said he would talk freely to 
the county attorney (T.31). 
The police questioning was not excessive or 
coercive. He was asked about his whereabouts on the 
evening in question and his explanation of the attack 
on Mrs. Murphy. Contrary to appellant's allegations, 
the officers who were present during questioning 
testified they did not suggest phrases to appellant 
(T.37,43). The officer read a couple of sentences 
from the report and asked appellant if they were 
true only after appellant had given a full explana-
tion of his account of the incident (T.37). Such 
th roughness should not be a reason for suggesting 
t appellant's statment was involuntary. 
-5-
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The fact that appellant may have a lower 
intellectual ability than general adult population 
should not be an automatic cause for excluding his 
admissions either. 
In State v. Ashdown, 5 Utah 2d 59, 296 P.2d 
726 (1956), the defendant was suspected of murdering 
her husband and was taken in for questioning immediately 
after the funeral. After five and one half hours of 
questioning, she admitted to having committed the 
crime. 
This Court described that defendant as "a 
person of limited education and was naturally emotion-
ally upset at the time of questioning." But in 
sustaining the admission of this confession, the Court 
said: 
"Manifestly, the will of a 
person who is of tender age or of weak 
intellect may be more easily overcome 
than that of one who is more mature 
or more intelligent. This alone, 
however, will not render a confession 
inadmissible and if the confession 
was obtained in a manner and by such 
methods as are consistent with the 
proper detention of crime and det7r-
mina tion of guilt, then our duty is 
to sustain the trial court." Id. at 
729. 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
r 
In accord: People v. Lara, 62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 
202 (1967) (mental subnormality of accused only one 
factor considered in deciding voluntariness of 
confession). 
Even if it could be adequately proven that 
this lower intelligence did make appellant more 
persuadable than a normal adult, the facts do not 
suggest that those who questioned him took advantage 
of this factor. 
A careful study of the facts will show that 
the factors mentioned in appellant's brief, taken 
individually or collectively, present no indication 
that the appellant was forced, or unduly persuaded, to 
answer questions or make his admission as to the attack 
on Mrs. Murphy. His presence at the station was 
voluntary, his rights were explained, the questioning 
was proper, both in form and content, his lower 
intellectual abilities were not preyed upon, and no 
means of threats or force were used. His voluntary 
admission was valid and was properly admitted into 
evidence. 
The Court in State v. Ashdown, supra, spoke 
decisively about affirmation of trial court's findings 
-7-
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in such an instance: 
". • . [A] fter the trial court 
has decided from the evidence that 
the confession was voluntarily made, 
the appellate court will not disturb 
the finding in the absence of a showing 
of abuse of its discretion where there 
is substantial evidence from which it 
could reasonably so find." Id. at 729. 
Substantial evidence of voluntariness exists 
in the present case and this decision should be. upheld. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT GRANTING A 
MISTRIAL BASED UPON CROSS-EXAMINATION OF APPELLANT'S 
WIFE. 
Appellant argues that the county attorney was 
guilty of misconduct by asking the appellant's wife, on 
cross-examination, if appellant had ever been convicted 
of a felony involving dishonesty. A close reading of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, however, will clearly show that 
such questioning was permissible. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 21, states::· · · 
"Evidence of the conviction of 
a witness for a crime not involving 
dishonesty or false statement shall 
be1110.dmissible for the purpose of 
impairing his credibility, except 
as otherwise provided by statute." 
(_Emphasis added.} 
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This Rule specifically excepts crimes of dis-
honesty and false statement from its prohibition against 
admission of evidence of crimes. Therefore, such evidence 
of crimes of dishonesty can be admitted under Rule 20, 
which states: 
"Subject to Rules 21 and 22, for 
purpose of impairing or supporting the 
credibility of a witness, any party 
including a party calling him may 
examine him and introduce extrinsic 
evidence concerning any statment or 
conduct by him and any other matter 
relevant upon the issues of credibility." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Examining other witnesses ~s to their knowledge 
of a conviction of a certain witness for a crime of 
dishonesty is within the scope and purpose of this Rule. 
Since appellant had taken the stand prior to the cross-
examination in question, he had become a witness and his 
credibility was susceptible to this type of attack. 
Rule 26(f) of Alaska's Rules of Criminal 
Procedure is very similar to Rule 21 of Utah's Rules 
of Evidence. Rule 26(f) says that for purpose of attacking 
credibility of witness, evidence that the witness has been 
convicted of a crime is only admissible if the crime 
involved dishonesty or false statement. The Alaska 
Supreme Court acknowledged this as a valid exception to 
-9-
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the general rule that evidence of crimes· is not admissible 
in Galauski v. State, 527 P.2d 450 (1974), when it stated: 
". . • [E] vidence of convictions 
for crimes involving dishonesty is 
admissible to show that a witness' 
testimony is unworthy." Id. at 467. 
For the same reasons, the questioning of Mrs. 
Peterson was permissible. Even if such questioning of 
Mrs. Peterson by the county attorney was somehow improper, 
it is totally a matter of conjecture that this one question 
caused the jury to be prejudiced against the appellant. 
Since the questioning was terminated even before an answer 
had been given, this questioning, if error, must be deemed 
harmless error since it did not have " a substantial 
influence in bringing about the verdict or finding," 
and this is required if a verdict is to be set aside 
for reason of erroneous admission of evidence. Utah Rules 
of Evidence, Rule 4. 
POINT IV 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED THAT APPELLANT 
TOUCHED THE PLAINTIFF'S GENITALS AND OTHER~ISE TOOK 
INDECENT LIBERTIES AND THUS THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME 
WERE PROVEN. 
-10-
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Appellant suggests that since the evidence 
shows that there was a layer of clothing between 
Mrs. Murphy's genitals and appellant's hand, that he 
did not "touch" the genitals in the statutory sense 
of the word. To accept such a limited definition of 
the word would distort the ordinary meaning of the 
word and would unduly limit the legislative intent 
of this statute. 
One can "touch" another's hand even though 
the other person is wearing gloves. A person can 
"touch" or hold an arm of another even though it is 
covered by a sleeve of a coat. Such is common use and 
understanding of the word "touch" and such usage should 
be applied in the present case. 
The legislature did not give this word a 
special definition in the statute in question. The 
required specificity needed to properly define the 
purpose of the statute is supplied by the intent 
required in order for someone to be guilty of forcible 
sexual abuse. It seems evident that if one touches 
the genitals of another with the intent to satisfy ·" 
sexual desire, even though the area he touched was 
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covered by the victim's underwear, he is guilty of the 
very thing which the legislature proscribed in this 
statute. 
Assuming, arguendo, that this technicality 
does prohibit appellant's actions from being seen as 
"touching" of another' s genitals, he has taken "indecent 
liberties" under any def ini ti on. The evidence presented 
established that appellant invaded a woman's body by 
forcing her to the ground and putting his hand up 
her dress for the satisfaction of sexual desire. Such 
evidence is clearly sufficient to establish that 
appellant was guilty of forcible sexual abuse as 
defined by the statute. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT ADMITTING 
TESTIMONY REGARDING APPELLANT'S SPECIFIC BEHAVIOR. 
Appellant called Barbara Batty to the stand 
to testify as a character witness in appellant's behalf. 
Appellant's counsel questioned Mrs. Batty as to 
appellant's behavior towards her when neither of 
their respective spouses were present. The 
prosecutor objected (T.82). After some debate on 
the legal issue of the admissibility of such evidence, 
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the Court sustained the objection (T.83-85). 
Appellant cites Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence as authority for his position. However, Rule 
47 is quite specific in defining what evidence will be 
allowed in the area of character traits. It reads in 
part: 
" ••• (b) in a criminal action 
evidence of a trait of an accused's 
character as tending to prove his 
guilt or innocence of the offense 
charged • • • may not be excluded by 
the judge • • • if offered by the 
accused to prove his innocence. • n 
In order for evidence to be admissible under 
this Rule, it must go directly to the character trait 
which is in question. It is difficult to see how 
evidence that appellant does not make sexual advances 
to a woman with whom he and his wife are good friends and 
with whom he and his wife frequently socialize with, has 
any probative value of determining if he would sexually 
attack a strange woman on the street at night. 
Any connection wl:iich this evidence may have to 
prove or disprove the trait in question is far too 
indirect to be relevant. As the note under Rule 47 
states, "The admission or rejection of character evidence 
depends primarily on the court's conception of its 
relevancy." The conception of the trial court in this 
-13-
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case was that such evidence was too remote and therefore 
inadmissible. 
An analogous situation existed in State v. 
Fairbanks, 171 P.2d 845 (1946). The def~ndant in that 
case was charged with taking indecent liberties with 
a female under the age of fifteen. The defendant called 
a witness to try and establish that the defendant was in 
the habit of calling upon young girls to answer telephone 
calls in the off ice. Presumably such evidence was 
offered to show that since the defendant had not taken 
indecent liberties with these girls, he did not have 
the character trait to take indecent liberties with 
the girls in question. The Washington Supreme Court 
flatly rejected this argument on appeal. It said: 
"We fail to perceive any 
materiality of the evidence indicated 
by the questions. If it was designed 
to show that appellant was a man of 
good character, it was incompetent." 
Id. at 848. 
The excluded evidence in the present case was 
likewise incompetent and irrelevant. The trial court's 
well-supported decision on its exclusion should be 
affirmed. 
-14-
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, respondent respectfully 
requests that the conviction of the lower court be 
affirmed. 
-15-
Respectfully submitted 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys':for Respondent 
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